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MAGINE living your life every day within a room from which you
could not escape. You try to find happiness within the four walls of
that room, but each day of your life you grow more miserable than
the preceding day. Finally, after a long, thorough search, you eventually
find a door, but it is locked. You call out for help, hoping someone with a
key will unlock the door, free you from the boundaries of the tiny room,
and allow you to attain peace, a state of mind you have never yet been
able to achieve. Such is the experience of a transsexual. Since courts
now encounter a greater number of transsexual litigants, judges must util-
ize an approach to resolving the legal disputes of transsexuals that values
the struggles and affirms the unique identities of transsexuals.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSSEXUALITY
AS A LEGAL ISSUE
Transsexualism, the dissatisfaction an individual feels with his/her gen-
der coupled with the desire to become the opposite gender, is not a phe-
nomenon unique to the past few decades, despite the attention it has
received from medical researchers, social scientists, journalists, and
screenwriters during this time.' Evidence of the transsexual phenomenon
exists in myths, historical accounts, and cultural anthropology records in
many different societies.2 These societies have formulated their own
ways of reconciling the fact that certain segments of the population are
born with characteristics both typically associated with males and with
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those usually considered female.3 The United States has always adhered
to a system of sex binaries as a way of classifying individuals. Sex classifi-
cation occurs at birth: birth attendants assign the sexes of male or female
to infants.4 This classification bears legal implications, as the determina-
tion is documented in birth certificates. 5 As children grow and mature,
they are expected to conform to the gender roles that correspond to their
assigned sexual classifications: men should exhibit characteristics associ-
ated with the masculine gender and women should exhibit characteristics
associated with the feminine gender.
For most people, including some intersexuals, this system does not pose
problems. 6 For transsexuals, however, this binary system of sex/gender
categorization often impedes their ability to lead normal lives. It with-
holds from them the rights and protections that the law affords to those
individuals who were "properly assigned" at birth. This paper attempts
to construct a functional approach that courts may use when the resolu-
tion of a legal dispute necessitates a determination of a transsexual liti-
gant's gender. Although this paper addresses issues relevant to all
members of the transgender community as well as to gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals, its primary purpose is to develop an approach that works to
effectuate the rights of transsexuals when they present their disputes
before the courts in this country.
Transsexuals form one subset of the group of individuals who identify
themselves as transgendered ("trans"). Trans individuals choose to ex-
press their genders in ways incongruous with the sexes to which they were
assigned at birth.7 Transsexuals desire to adopt the opposite gender role
and to bring their biological sex in conformity with the adopted gender
role. 8 Cross-dressers, drag queens, and hermaphrodites are trans individ-
uals who may defy gender norms but, unlike transsexuals, do not manifest
an extreme dissatisfaction with their bodies' sexual characteristics. 9 In an
effort to join political forces with other socially marginalized groups,
some trans advocates now use the term "trans" to refer to all types of
individuals whose lifestyles and/or behaviors transgress the established
boundaries of gender categorization, including feminine men and mascu-
3. Julie A. Greenberg, Symposium: Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Defining Male and Fe-
male: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265,, 276-
78 (1999).
4. Id. at 271.
5. Id.
6. HAROLD I. KAPLAN, M.D. & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, M.D., SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIA-
TRY: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 714 (Robert Cancro, M.D., Med.
D.Sc. et. al. eds., 8th ed. 1998). "Intersex conditions include a variety of syndromes in
which people have gross anatomical or physiological aspects of the opposite sex." Id.
7. JASON CROMWELL, TRANSMEN & FTMs: IDENTITIES, BODIES, GENDERS & SEXU-
ALITIES 23 (1999).
8. Id. at 20-21.
9. RIKI ANNE WILCHINS, READ My LIPS: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF
GENDER 15-16 (1997) (Wilchins uses the term "trans-identified people" to emphasize the
processes of self-identification and social categorization.).
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line women of the gay, lesbian, and heterosexual communities. 10
Social and educational interest in transsexuality has peaked at different
times in different countries around the world. In the United States, sci-
ence, medicine, and literature have pondered transgender issues with fer-
vor since the 1950s. a1 Legal development regarding these issues,
however, seems to have progressed slowly until just this past decade
when trans individuals, seeking resolution of their disputes in court, have
received much attention from legal scholars.12 Transsexuality in particu-
lar presents a challenge for the courts. Due to the increasing number of
sex reassignment surgeries performed within the past thirty-five years,
courts are encountering transsexual litigants more frequently. They find
themselves grappling with gender determination since "transsexual issues
have or will arise in situations involving penal institutions, schools, sports,
employment, and every other situation in which perceived gender is im-
portant.' a3 As cultural awareness also continues to increase, the most
recent judicial opinions have aroused significant public attention.
III. TRANS ISSUES AS PROBLEMATIC FOR THE COURTS
Social institutions operate under the principle that gender is one of the
most important elements that defines one's identity. 14 Courts, however,
need to understand the arguments challenging the well-established princi-
ple that an individual can be classified either as male or female. Specifi-
cally, biological evidence suggests that the principle of sex binaries, relied
upon by society for so many years, may be unfounded. 15 Because society
still relies upon this system and because legal acceptance of alternative
forms of gender expression does not yet exist, the best solution to the
issue of gender determination of transsexuals is an approach that respects
their newly constructed gender identities within the framework of the sex
binary. This paper considers the approaches of sex determination-sex
classification of individuals based upon the sex assigned at birth-and
gender self-identification-gender classification based upon how the indi-
vidual defines his or her own gender-and rejects them both as problem-
atic and ineffective for judicial determinations of the genders of
transsexual litigants. Instead, this paper advocates a compromise called
"gender assessment" that views gender as a continuum of expression,
with male and female at ends of the spectrum. Sexual and social charac-
10. Id. at 16; see also LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE
10, 47 (1998) ("Trans people are still literally social outlaws.").
11. See BENJAMIN, supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet.
denied). The court had less than a handful of applicable cases from before 1990 to con-
sider when deciding the issue of whether the marriage between a male and a transsexual
female is valid under state law. Both the increase in the number of trans cases and the
growth of the trans liberation movement have sparked new legal research in this area. See
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 292.
13. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1106 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
14. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 6, at 711.
15. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 292.
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teristics function as indicators along the spectrum, and assessment of
these indicators is always made in favor of the gender role the transsexual
has worked to adopt. Gender self-identification is advocated by the trans
liberation movement. Members of the movement challenge objective
definitions of sex/gender championed by conservative groups by calling
for societal acceptance of nontraditional forms of gender expressions.
The conservative groups endorse a sex determination approach because it
precludes legal recognition of nontraditional forms of gender expression.
Evaluation of the proposals of the trans liberation movement as well as
arguments from its opposition will logically lead courts, for now, to the
adoption of a middle-ground approach for determining the genders of
transsexual litigants that respects the binary sex/gender model yet fosters
more expansive definitions of what it means to be male and female.
Transsexuals pose a unique problem for the courts. When transsexuals
appeal to the courts seeking resolution of their disputes, often the resolu-
tion of their disputes depends upon their classification as either male or
female. Since transsexuals defy society's unfounded assumption that in-
dividuals must adopt the gender role that corresponds to their assigned
sex, a new, flexible approach for dealing with this unique group of people
is necessary. Objective approaches to the problem prove unworkable not
only for transsexuals but for other trans individuals such as intersex or
masculine females and feminine males. The concept that one's pheno-
typic characteristics should conform to one's genetic structure does not
hold true for individuals who have made every effort to bring their sexual
characteristics in conformity with their adopted gender role. Courts fol-
lowing a sex determination approach hold that a male to female transsex-
ual is legally a male because of her genetic composition, despite the fact
that she may possess a dozen other attributes that society would normally
define as feminine. 16 Subjective approaches, advocating sex/gender self-
identification, create their own problems as well. If unbridled, subjective
approaches open the door to chaos in the legal arenas of sex discrimina-
tion, marital rights, and other areas of law that mandate classification of
litigants as male or female. Manipulation of the law by individuals who
are not trans but who have decided to take advantage of the principles of
sex/gender self-identification with the purpose of creating a new identity
solely for the purpose of evading legal responsibilities imposed upon
them by law or seeking legal protection that does not rightly extend to
them is a risk.
IV. MEDICAL CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSSEXUALS
The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders ("DSM-IV") presents transsexuals as suffering from gender




identity disorder ("GID"). 17 "The essential feature of [GID] is a person's
persistent and intense distress about his or her assigned sex and desire to
be, or an insistence that he or she is of, the other sex."'1 8 The Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases ("ICD-10") articulates criteria for the
identification of transsexualism, defining the disease as one specific type
of GID. "Transsexualism, defined as a wish to be a member of the oppo-
site sex, can be diagnosed when the transsexual identity has persisted for
at least 2 years, is not the symptom of another mental disorder, and is not
associated with intersex, genetic, or sex chromosome abnormality.' 19
In 1979, the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Associa-
tion established standards of care for the treatment of GID, with the pur-
pose of articulating the "international organization's professional
consensus about the psychiatric, psychological, medical, and surgical
management of gender identity disorders."'20 The Association established
guidelines for triadic therapy, one possible treatment for GID.2l Triadic
therapy consists of real life experience living as the new gender, hormone
therapy, and sexual reassignment/gender confirming surgeries such as
genital reconstruction and/or breast surgery.22 Since achieving each of
these steps is not the advisable procedure for every transsexual, other
methods of treatment are available. 23 Triadic therapy affords the best
opportunity for transsexuals to bring their sexual characteristics in con-
formity with the gender role they adopt.24 To participate in triadic ther-
apy, transsexuals must meet eligibility and readiness requirements which
involve the completion of several steps, including a comprehensive evalu-
ation by a qualified mental health professional.2 5
V. TRADITIONAL SEX DETERMINATION OF
TRANSSEXUALS
A. LITTLETON V. PRANGE
In the 1999 case of Littleton v. Prange, the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals of Texas held that a post-operative female transsexual is biologically
17. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 6, at 712. "DSM-IV... is the official psychiatric
coding system used in the United States." Id. at 287. Widely used by psychiatrists and
other health care professionals, it provides a comprehensive list of mental disorders and
their diagnostic criteria. Id.
18. Id. at 712.
19. Id. at 716. "The ICD is the official medical and psychiatric nosology used through-
out most of the world." Id. at 287.
20. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of





25. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of
Care for Gender Identity Disorders, at http://www.hbigda.org/soc5.html (which lists in de-
tail the requirements for the treatment of gender disorders in adults, adolescents, and
children).
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a male.26 Although the court considered various factors for determining
the sex of the appellant, Christie Littleton, it essentially concluded that
her chromosomal structure dictates that she is male.27 Factors such as
Christie's sexual reassignment surgery, hormone treatment plan, and psy-
chological state of mind proved inconsequential to the court's decision.2 8
The court erred in holding that Christie is a man as a matter of law.
Judge Hardberger selected a narrow approach to the issue when the issue
demanded a workable analysis. He chose to adhere to the same inflexi-
ble, objective sex determination analysis utilized by other jurisdictions
when he should have utilized the more functional approach of gender
assessment.
Christie was born in San Antonio, Texas in 1952 as Lee Cavazos, Jr., a
biological male.29 She developed normal male genetalia, including penis,
scrotum, and testicles. In her early childhood years, however, Christie
began experiencing feelings of gender dysphoria.30 These feelings of
wanting to become a female compelled her to seek assistance in obtaining
sexual reassignment surgery from a program at the University of Texas
Health Science Center.31 After completing the necessary psychological
treatments and a hormone therapy plan, Christie legally changed her
name to Christie Lee Cavazos in 1977.32 By 1980, Christie had success-
fully undergone sexual reassignment surgery.33 In 1989, she married a
man named Jonathon Mark Littleton in Kentucky.34
When Jonathon died in 1996, Christie sued Jonathon's physician for
medical malpractice under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Stat-
ute ("TWDSS") in her capacity as Jonathon's surviving spouse.35 Dr.
Prange moved for summary judgment, arguing that Christie lacked stand-
ing to bring her claim because she is actually a man and, as such, legally
cannot be the wife of Jonathon. 36 Christie responded to the motion for
summary judgment.37 After considering the summary judgment evi-
dence, the trial court granted summary judgment.38 Christie appealed. 39
Christie's appeal of the summary judgment motion consisted of four
parts.40 First, Dr. Prange did not sustain his burden of establishing as a
matter of law that Christie and Jonathon's marriage was a same-sex mar-
26. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 230.











40. Id. at 229.
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riage.41 Second, Dr. Prange did not sustain his burden of establishing as a
matter of law that when Christie married Jonathon she was a male and
that the sex determination of a post-operative transsexual for purposes of
marriage does not occur at birth.42 Third, Dr. Prange did not sustain his
burden of establishing as a matter of law that Christie's marriage was
void.43 Fourth, since Christie produced summary judgment evidence rais-
ing a genuine issue of material fact, the court should reverse the summary
judgment.44
Because Christie's claim against the doctor was brought under the
TWDSS, the court needed to determine whether Jonathon's and Chris-
tie's marriage created a valid union under Texas law.45 Although Christie
and Jonathon had participated in a marriage ceremony in Kentucky, if the
court concluded that Christie was a male, Texas law would not recognize
the marriage. 46 She, therefore, would not meet the spousal status re-
quirement of the TWDSS and would lack standing to bring her claim.47
The issue of whether a post-operative female transsexual is a man or a
woman was one of first impression in Texas. 48 Because the Texas legisla-
ture had established no guidelines for determining how transsexuals
should be recognized under the TWDSS, the court concluded that it
could not permit the jury to decide the question of Christie's sex.49 Treat-
ing the issue as a pure question of law, the court analyzed what it consid-
ered to be the appropriate factors for reaching a conclusion. 50
B. THE FAILURE OF SEX CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS
Littleton relied upon a sex determination analysis when approaching
the issue of whether Christie and Jonathon had a legal union in Texas. A
determination of Christie's sex does not resolve the issue of the case; if
anything, it only muddies the waters. Instead, the court needed to focus
upon Christie's adopted gender role. Clinically, the term "sex" is defined
as "attributes that collectively, and usually harmoniously, characterize bi-
ological maleness and femaleness [including] sex-determining genes, the
sex chromosomes, the X-Y sex-determining antigen, the gonads, the sex
hormones, the internal reproductive structures, and the external genita-
lia."'51 Medical scholars understand gender to encompass "behaviors, at-









49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 230-31.
51. KENNETH J. ZUCKER, PH.D. & SUSAN J. BRADLEY, M.D., GENDER IDENTITY DIs-
ORDER AND PSYCHOSEXUAL PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 2 (1995).
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historical period, designates as masculine or feminine. '5 2 Although the
terms sex and gender are sometimes used interchangeably in non-medical
contexts, the difference in meaning between the words might have led the
court to reach a more favorable outcome for Christie. Typically, "judges
either accept the claims in a manner consistent with traditional thinking
about gender (more rarely) or reject transsexual claims altogether (more
often)."5 3
After noting Christie's male XY chromosomes, her physician-con-
structed female features, and her lack of female reproductive organs,
Judge Hardberger concluded that since Christie was genetically and ana-
tomically a male at birth, she could do nothing that would change her sex
classification.54 This statement ignores the reality of the small but nota-
ble group of individuals who are born with genetic abnormalities or who
experience non-normative sexual development. Examination of how the
medical profession deals with these anomalies promotes the conclusion
that "arbitrary" best describes the sex of these select individuals. Con-
sider the case of an individual diagnosed with testicular feminisation. De-
spite being born with male chromosomes, she has developed sexually as a
female.55 She possesses the anatomy, hormones, physical appearance,
and, most importantly, the social characteristics of a female.56 From a
medical perspective, "telling [her] that she is fundamentally male but with
abnormal sexual development.., does nothing to help: it simply destroys
a most fundamental part of a person's identity-gender .... The explana-
tion offered should begin from the understanding that [she] is female, and
it should build on that assumption. T57 This example suggests that sex is
not an immutable characteristic for certain people.
Consider also the case of an infant born with physical intersex charac-
teristics: mixed female and male sexual features. Sometimes an infant is
born with genitalia so ambiguous that the sex to which the infant should
be assigned is not evident; assignment in these cases involves a thoughtful
discussion between the physician and the parents as to which sex would
best serve the interests of the child. Established guidelines aid the physi-
cians and parents who jointly decide to which sex they will assign the
infant.5 8 The first guideline suggests that the chosen sex should be the
one that carries the best prognosis for good reproductive function, prom-
ising sexual function, normal-looking external genitalia and physical ap-
52. Id. at 3.
53. Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judi-
cial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 331 (1999).
54. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
55. James A. 0. Ahlquist, Phenotypically, Anatomically, Legally, and Socially Female,
308 THE BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 1041 (1994).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Susan J. Bradley, M.D., et al., Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio Penis at 2 Months,




pearance, and a stable gender identity. 59 This decision-making process of
the parents and the physician of the infant clearly negates Judge
Hardberger's assertion that "some things we cannot will into being. They
just are."'60 Persons born with 47 (XXY) or 45 (X) chromosomes instead
of the normal 46 (XX) or 46 (XY) structure, the woman devoid of breasts
and a uterus after undergoing a double mastectomy and hysterectomy,
and the male weightlifter who has experienced feminization effects after
having taken steroids his entire adult life present problems for Judge
Hardberger's sex determination approach. Interpreted literally, his anal-
ysis in Littleton suggests that the courts would require guidelines from the
legislature in order to determine how to adjudicate the claims of these
individuals when the applicable law necessitates classification based on
sex. In reality the courts classify these individuals not based upon sex,
but on gender-specifically, the gender roles that the individuals have
adopted-using, as markers of gender, certain physical characteristics the
individuals exhibit to the world. Thus, gender assessment for transsexuals
requires no departure from courts' current analysis in these unique cases.
VI. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
A. PRESERVING LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Classification based on gender assessment proves more accurate than
classification based upon sex in reaching the results intended by the legis-
lature. Because sex is a compilation of many anatomical, physiological,
and genetic characteristics, it would be difficult for courts to arrive at
confident conclusions were they to attempt to determine an individual's
sex. Attempts could be made based on a balancing of the sex characteris-
tics, but this analysis would yield unintended and illogical consequences.
As in Christie's case, a balancing of her sex characteristics produced a
legal determination that contradicted her established gender expression.
Assessment of the sex characteristics in favor of the gender role the
transsexual litigant has chosen to adopt eliminates this problem. Further-
more, it lends legal credibility to the involved medical processes a
transsexual undergoes to bring his or her sex in conformity with his or her
chosen gender role.
In addition to avoiding the social contradictions that Judge
Hardberger's sex determination approach creates, an analysis based upon
gender assessment provides a resolution to the issue in Littleton that fur-
thers the legislative intent of the Texas statute regulating the granting of
marriage licenses. The statute reads, "a license may not be issued for the
marriage of persons of the same sex."'61 It exemplifies the common prac-
tice of interchanging the words "sex" and "gender," for undoubtedly the
legislators intended to prohibit marriage between individuals who hold
59. Id.
60. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
61. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 1998).
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themselves out to the world as the same gender. Reasoning otherwise
leads to the conclusion that spouses with genetic or developmental abnor-
malities may have problems if a court were to rule upon the validity of
their marriages. Thus, the statute should be construed in such a manner
as to effectuate its purpose, rather than in a way that creates unintended
and undesirable results.
One can infer that since the Texas Legislature amended this statute a
year after the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") was passed, the in-
tent aligns with that of DOMA. The federal statute, however, incorpo-
rates the same invalid assumptions about sex that form the basis of
Littleton:
We are each of us, born a man or a woman. The committee needs no
testimony from an expert witness to decode this point. Our engen-
dered existence, as men and women offers the most unmistakable,
natural signs of the meaning and purpose of sexuality. And that is
the function and purpose of begetting.62
The legislators intended through DOMA and presumably through the
Texas statute, "to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual mar-
riage.' '63 They failed to acknowledge, however, that heterosexual unions
begin with an attraction for the opposite gender, not necessarily the op-
posite sex. That is, all individuals, heterosexuals and homosexuals, select
their spouses on the basis of gender role, not on the basis of genetic
makeup. The law implicitly relies upon this practice, given that it does
not require genetic karyotyping of engaged couples. The best reading of
the Texas statute is one that construes the term "sex" as referring to gen-
der since the meaning of sex endorses arbitrariness whereas the meaning
of gender promotes results intended by the Texas Legislature.
The intent of the Texas marital licensing statute is really to prohibit
marriages between individuals of the same gender, regardless of whether
both spouses happen to possess the same chromosomal structures or even
maintain similar sexual characteristics. Legislators contend, "society has
an interest in maintaining and protecting the institution of heterosexual
marriage because it has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging re-
sponsible procreation and child-rearing. ' 64 Nonetheless, they choose to
recognize as valid heterosexual unions in which one or both spouses are
sterile.65 Clearly, the inability of the transsexual to procreate with his/her
spouse poses no unresolved problem. Judge Hardberger's approach to
Christie Littleton's situation produced a legal precedent contrary to the
intent of the Texas marital licensing statute. A decision based upon gen-
der assessment would have eliminated this contrary result.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996), microformed on CIS No. 96-H523-23
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (quoting Prepared Statement of Hadley Arkes, Ney Professor of Juris-
prudence and America Institutions, Amherst College, at 11-12, Subcommittee Hearing).
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id. at 14.
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B. AVOIDANCE OF UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES
In Texas on September 6, 2000, Bexar County Clerk Gerry Rickoff is-
sued Jessica Wicks and Robin Manhart a marriage license, and the couple
wed on September 16.66 Manhart is a biological female and Wicks is a
male to female transsexual, like Christie Littleton.67 According to Lit-
tleton, Wicks is biologically a man; thus, her marriage to Manhart does
not violate the Texas marital licensing statute.68 Based on Littleton, Rick-
off concluded that if a woman has an "M" on her original birth certificate,
she can marry another woman who has an "F."'69 Despite the informa-
tion their birth certificates provide, both Wicks and Manhart hold them-
selves out to the world as being female. The union flaunts the
appearance and embodies all of the same qualities as that of a homosex-
ual union even though Wicks has an XY chromosome structure. Their
valid union promotes the government's interest in heterosexual unions
only in form. In reality, it produces the opposite effect. After Wicks and
Manhart were issued a marriage license, the couple's attorney publicly
invited "any female-to-male transsexual in a gay relationship as well as
any male-to-female transsexual in a lesbian relationship to take a week's
vacation, fly in [to the 4th Court's jurisdiction], wait the 72 hours required
and get married. '70
The attorney's statement paints an accurate picture of the unintended
consequences resulting from the sex determination analysis used in Lit-
tleton. Gender assessment would have eradicated results such as these
that prove contradictory to what the Texas Legislature desired. Clearly,
when the Texas Legislature drafted its marriage statute, it aimed to elimi-
nate the possibility of two individuals of the same gender joining together
in marriage. The inference that the focus was upon gender differences
proves logical since the legislature chose to make no special exceptions
for individuals with genetic or physical abnormalities. The likely conclu-
sion from reading the statute is that as long as two people who desire to
marry look and act to the world like people of the opposite gender, Texas
will permit a union between them. Courts following a gender assessment
approach will avoid results contrary to the statute because their determi-
nations will be more accurate. They will classify transsexuals based upon
the observable gender expression. Courts will base their determinations
upon how individuals have chosen to hold themselves out to the world.
Because gender assessment yields outcomes congruent with the intent
of the Texas marital licensing statute, the approach does not assure every
transsexual litigant a victory in the courtroom. If relying upon gender
66. Ruling Lets Transsexual Marry Another Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000 (late
edition), at A18.
67. Id.
68. See Polly Ross Hughes, Lesbians' Plans to Wed Look Legal; Bexar County Ruling
Could Pave Way for Trip Down Aisle, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 31, 2000, Al.
69. Id.
70. Adolfo Pesquera, Lesbian Couple Get License to Wed; Transsexual Ruling Clears
the Way, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 7, 2000, at lB.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
assessment results in a finding that a transsexual lives as a partner in a
same-sex union, the courts cannot protect the transsexual from the neces-
sary conclusion that the marriage is invalid. For instance, had Littleton
utilized a gender assessment approach, Wicks and Manhart would never
have received a marriage license in Texas. Even when courts begin to
accept that gender is a mutable characteristic, difficult situations continue
to arise.71 For instance, a spouse who underwent sexual reassignment
surgery during the course of a heterosexual marriage could attempt to
bring a wrongful death action for the other spouse's death; however, be-
cause sexual reassignment surgery in this case created a same sex union,
without future legislative exceptions for transsexuals, the litigant would
lack standing. For now, gender assessment would permit certain transsex-
uals like Christie to make legal claims relating to marriage without asking
courts to formulate judicial exceptions to applicable statutes.
VII. GENDER SELF-IDENTIFICATION
A. TRANS LIBERATION
Gender self-identification is another approach to determining the
rights of transsexuals that the courts must consider. Usage of the term
varies, but this comment defines gender self-identification as one's ability
to shape his or her gender independent of societal expectations that only
two gender roles exist. The most audible advocates of gender self-identi-
fication are activists of trans liberation. A movement aimed at rallying
support for trans people, trans liberation is founded upon the belief that
society should not categorize individuals as male or female but rather
should allow individuals the opportunity to adopt more complex forms of
gender expressions.
Most trans individuals are not classified as mentally ill, unlike transsex-
uals. "Some [clinicians] employ [the term transgendered] to refer to
those with unusual gender identities in a value free manner-that is, with-
out a connotation of psychopathology. ' 72 A majority of trans individuals
feel little or no dissatisfaction with the sexual characteristics with which
they were born; however, they find undesirable the gender expression
that society expects of them simply because of the sex characteristics they
possess.
Members of the trans liberation movement advocate gender self-identi-
fication, but they remain highly critical of a gender assessment approach.
Gender assessment reinforces the notion that only two possible gender
expressions exist. Trans people want society to offer them options other
71. Keller, supra note 53, at 383 ("If judges were to adopt a position of elastic tenabil-
ity, whether across the board, or at opportune moments, the results would not produce
coherence where earlier there were key contradictions; the incoherence would simply be of
a different kind.").
72. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of
Care for Gender Identity Disorders, at http://www.hbigda.org/soc5.html.
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than categorization as male or female. 73 They struggle with normal eve-
ryday events that force them to decide between two poles of what medi-
cal research now calls a gender continuum.74 For instance, a person with
a female body who has adopted masculine gender characteristics and
therefore presents herself to the world as a male makes an agonizing
choice when deciding which public restroom to choose.75 Either choice
condemns the person in one way or another. When applying for pass-
ports or driver's licenses, trans people must choose between checking the
box that the law dictates they must check or the alternative box, which
may better conform to their gender expressions. 76 Essentially they chose
between commission of a crime or personal satisfaction. Many despise
both choices and advocate for an alternative box. Leslie Feinberg, a
leader of the Trans Liberation movement, writes:
Personally, I would . . . benefit from expanding concepts and lan-
guage of gender possibilities .... I was born female, and my gender
expression is masculine. For that reason, my birth sex and my gender
expression appear to be at odds. I believe this is a social contradic-
tion that can only exist in a society that mandates-with coercive
force-that gender expression must conform to birth biology.77
Because of her male gender expression, Feinberg has encountered dis-
crimination no less compelling than that faced by members of minority
races within this country. Police have arrested her for wearing men's
clothing in public, mental health professionals have refused to treat her,
and strangers have attacked her for looking and acting like a man. 78
Now, as an activist in the movement, Feinberg works "to put a halt to
'legal' and extralegal violence against trans people. ' 79
Trans people hope for the dissolution of the sex/gender binary system.
They challenge society to broaden the possibilities for gender expression.
Where the binary system still remains, they call for recognition that cate-
gorization of an individual as male or female should not matter. Compar-
ing gender classification to racial classification, Feinberg foresees the day
when checking a male or female box is no longer a requirement for offi-
cial documents and such. She writes: "[Ajuthorities ... say such rules
cannot be changed. But when I was a kid, I was required to put down my
race on documents. That was mandatory-until the Civil Rights and
73. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 5 ("[Trans people's] lives are proof that sex and gen-
der are much more complex than a delivery room doctor's glance at genitals can deter-
mine, more variegated than pink or blue birth caps. We are oppressed for not fitting those
narrow social norms. We are fighting back.").
74. See Anne Vitale, A Brief Description of the Problem (1997), at http://www.avitale.
com/MenuPage.html.
75. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 19.
76. Id. at 23. See also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 292 ("Although some jurisdictions
allow individuals to amend their official documents to reflect the person's self-identified
sex, intersexuals and transsexuals are typically legally categorized by biological criteria that
often do not comport with their self-identified sex.").
77. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 29.




Black liberation movements challenged the racist underpinnings. Then
the authorities were forced to remove the 'race' box."'80 As Feinberg
travels throughout the country garnering more support for the trans liber-
ation movement, she battles against the conservative groups of this coun-
try that are unwilling to find a place for gender self-identification within
the legal system.
B. THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT
The experiences of Feinberg and other trans people cannot be ignored
by our courts of law. The problem facing the courts is the long-standing
binary sex/gender system upon which many laws operate. "A variety of
federal and state statutes and regulations differentiate between individu-
als based upon their sex and gender, or their status as males and females
or men and women. '81 Marriage, discrimination, and other areas of law
are predicated upon an understanding that an individual can be easily
classified as male or female. Many conservative political groups, standing
in opposition to trans liberation, support a movement to preserve the bi-
nary system and confine possible gender expression to male and female.
Gender self-identification faces attack from many conservative groups.
Trans people have increasingly joined forces with homosexuals and bisex-
uals to form the Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Transgendered ("GLBT") move-
ment.82 Although trans people believe that joining forces with gays and
lesbians can only further support for the movement and, therefore, lead
to swifter achievement of the movement's goals, they also now face the
same kind of opposition that the gay and lesbian rights movement has
encountered from conservative political groups. 83 GLBT people feel es-
pecially targeted by the Religious Right, which has gained political power
over the past two decades. 84 The Religious Right, a dominant presence
within the Republican Party, has worked to halt the advances of the
GLBT rights movement. 85 Activists in the conservative groups stand
firm in their opinion that the sexuality issues championed by the GLBT
movement deserve no special protection under law.86 "Where [GLBT]
80. Id. at 21.
81. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 270.
82. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 47, 55.
83. Id.
84. Paul Mazur, Religion in American Politics and the Religious Right, in GAY/LEs-
BIAN/BISEXUALTRANSGENDER PUBLIC POLICY ISSUEs 3 (Wallace K. Swan DPA ed. 1997).
85. Id. at 3 ("The significant victory for the Religious Right in the cultural war [in
1994] left civil rights and gay rights activists, feminists, civil libertarians, and many others
stunned because the agenda of the Religious Right called for rolling back many of the
legislative advances made by those groups over the years.").
86. See Republican Party, National Platform 2000, at http://www.rnc.org/2000/2000plat
formcontents.
We support the traditional definition of "marriage" as the legal union of one
man and one woman, and we believe that federal judges and bureaucrats
should not force states to recognize other living arrangements as marriages.
We rely on the home, as did the founders of the American Republic, to instill
the .virtues that sustain democracy itself. That belief led Congress to enact
the Defense of Marriage Act, which a Republican Department of Justice will
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people want their relationships with partners validated, members of the
Religious Right find biblical passages emphasizing that only opposite-sex
marriage relationships are valid."'8 7 Conservative groups base their legal
arguments on the concept of family values.88 They uphold a definition of
family that comports with Judeo-Christian traditions, believing "God has
defined the family as one man married to one woman, their children, and
those related to them by blood, adoption, or marriage."8 9 Finding no ba-
sis in legal history, they understand the goals of the GLBT movement to
directly conflict with their belief in the preservation of family values
through legislative power.
C. PROBLEMS WITH GENDER SELF-IDENTIFICATION
Even if one does not adhere to the same set of values championed by
the Religious Right, these conservative groups address certain legitimate
legal problems with gender self-identification. The fact is, "[i]mplicit in
legislation utilizing the terms 'sex' and 'gender' are the assumptions that
only two biological sexes exist." 90 Since the courts' role is to discern the
meaning of the law, using legislative intent when necessary, they have the
power to infer that, within specific contexts, sex actually means gender.
But the courts have little room to move beyond this inference considering
that the intent of most marital legislation prohibiting same-sex marriage
comports with that of the Defense of Marriage Act and aims to preserve
traditional family values. The underpinnings of these statutes depend
upon a society that identifies individuals as only two possible types of
genders.91 Until the legislature provides the courts with any further legis-
lation by which the courts should make determinations regarding legiti-
mate unions, courts may find themselves unable to utilize gender self-
identification approaches.
Besides the danger of usurping legislative power, the courts face an
additional problem of the lack of articulated boundaries for gender self-
identification. Until legislatures choose to recognize alternative genders,
gender self-identification creates a greater potential for chaos inside the
courtroom. Were the courts to follow gender self-identification ap-
proaches, they would permit individuals to create their own genders and
would wed themselves to these self-constructed gender expressions that
may, in fact, be of a transient nature. The legitimate concern of some
courts is whether gender self-identification would provide certain individ-
uals with a legally legitimate way of defrauding creditors or shirking ac-
energetically defend in the courts. For the same reason, we do not believe
sexual preference should be given special legal protection or standing in law.
Id.
87. Mazur, supra note 84, at 13.
88. Alliance Defense Fund, Alliance Defense Fund Protects Family Values, at http://
www.alliancedefensefund.org.
89. Id. ("Family values are the ideals and beliefs that support and give strength to the
traditional definition of a family.").




quired responsibilities. One possible method of control is that gender
self-identification would be confined to those who are diagnosed with
GID, but this constraint disadvantages individuals who lack the funds
necessary to undergo medical evaluation. By adopting a gender self-iden-
tification policy for all individuals, courts increase the chance of manipu-
lation of the laws by individuals who are willing to take advantage of the
highly flexible judicial criteria for identification. Furthermore, some ob-
jective standard for determining gender is necessary so long as gender
remains an essential way of classifying individuals.
One can draw an analogy between gender self-identification and racial
self-identification. Despite the movement by a number of multi-racial in-
dividuals to create a multi-racial category by which they can identify
themselves, the law in most states adheres to the one drop of Black blood
rule. That is,
[t]he term "white" as used in the census report refers to persons un-
derstood to be pure-blooded whites. A person of mixed blood is
classified according to the nonwhite racial strain .... thus a person
of mixed white ... and Negro ... is classified as ... a Negro...
regardless of the amount of white blood .... 92
Although the possibility of a multi-racial category seems like the best so-
lution to the issue of racial classification, the approach exhibits its own
problems. Specifically, the proposal is critiqued because "it forces bira-
cial people to choose between two valid identities. '' 93 Identifying as
multi-racial denies the individual of black and white descent the ability of
being identified as African-American. This precludes the bi-racial indi-
vidual from formally identifying as part of the strong cultural unity of-
fered to him/her because of history.94
The important point to consider from this analogy is that until society
does in fact broaden its horizons with regard to race and gender, catego-
ries still exist. Despite an individual's attempt at self-identification, soci-
ety makes choices for the individual, regardless of the ability to self-
identify. As Christine B. Hickman describes, when the parents of a bi-
racial child go to an adoption agency, how the parents identify the child is
of little importance; what matters is how society identifies the child.95 By
attempting to deny association with the pre-established categories by
placing themselves outside the boxes, multi-racial individuals only work
to narrow the categories and diminish the importance of the cultural heri-
tage that has provided the strength for members of each race as they
function in society. The same rationale applies to gender self-identifica-
tion: regardless of what type of gender role the individual adopts, society
92. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, Afri-
can Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (1997) (quoting Bureau
of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, at
10 (1923)).
93. Id. at 1259.
94. Id. at 1246-48.
95. Id. at 1250.
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will, for now, classify him/her as either male or female. The most appro-
priate role for the courts, in light of the legislature's adherence to the
binary of male and female, is to validate different forms of gender expres-
sion by allowing for expansions of the definitions of pre-existing
categories.
VIII. A FUNCTIONAL COMPROMISE: GENDER ASSESSMENT
Just like sex determination analysis fails to recognize the reality that
gender expression does not always equate to biological characteristics,
the gender self-identification approach fails to recognize that as long as
society continues to operate under the binary system of male and female,
self-identification proves unworkable for practical reasons. The gender
assessment approach offers the most logical and functional analysis for
the courts, given the legislative backdrop with which they are working.
Through this approach, courts can effectuate the rights of individuals who
represent deviations from the strict traditional characterizations of men
and women without rejecting the legislative values upon which these
characterizations are based.
The first step is recognition. Using terms such as sex and gender in-
terchangibly proves detrimental to the transsexual individual because it
invalidates the identity change of the transsexual. Since it is currently
impossible to alter the genetic make-up of individuals, a transsexual born
with normal sex chromosomes will always have a significant sexual char-
acteristic that does not match with the gender role he/she has chosen to
adopt. Equating this one, albeit major, sex characteristic with one's gen-
der negates every step the transsexual has taken to reach the goal of
maintaining a stable lifestyle as the opposite gender. Alternatively, ac-
ceptance of the idea that gender is a continuum running from absolute
male on one end to absolute female on the other and that genital sexual
physiology may not necessarily be congruent with gender identity opens
the door to more well-reasoned and fair opinions. 96 Through a legal rec-
ognition of the differences between sex and gender and an understanding
that the two concepts do not necessarily match in certain individuals, the
courts defer to the conclusions of medical research regarding GID and
show the proper sensitivity to issues facing transsexuals.
The second step is determining expanded concepts of the two estab-
lished genders. Gender assessment best achieves this goal. Under a gen-
der assessment approach, courts begin their analysis with the
presumption that a transsexual's gender is based upon his/her behavior
and expression that declares his/her gender to the world.97 Socially estab-
lished qualities of male and female comprise the gender assessment scale,
but unlike a sex determination analysis, gender assessment embraces the
idea of a gender continuum. Founded upon the premise that traditional
96. See Vitale, supra note 74.
97. See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 6, at 711.
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notions of male and female are poles, gender assessment considers all
relevant sexual and social characteristics of the individual which function
as markers on the gender continuum. These markers guide the courts in
determining toward which pole the transsexual litigant gravitates.
This approach works best for post-operative transsexuals. Courts will
have no trouble identifying the gender presumption, as the transsexual's
assumed gender role is firmly established as part of triadic therapy. 98 The
court then considers the various sexual and social characteristics, which
function as indicators on the continuum, pointing toward either of the
two poles. Gender assessment proves especially effective for post-opera-
tive transsexuals because the transsexual adopts the other gender not
only by taking on the societal role of the other gender but also by acquir-
ing some of the sexual characteristics of that gender. Thus, the majority
of the post-operative transsexual's indicators will always yield an assess-
ment in favor of the adopted gender role. Unlike in a sex determination
analysis, having male sex chromosomes will not preclude a male-to-fe-
male transsexual from being legally recognized as female because the
other assessment criteria will gravitate toward the female pole. Thus, the
court legally recognizes the gender corresponding to the weighted pole.
When the court discovers a discrepancy between the presumed gender
and several of the indicators, the court must assess in favor of the
adopted gender role. Doing so legally legitimizes the non-surgical meth-
ods of treatment that certain transsexuals elect to receive. This method
proves effective because gender assessment will always yield the results
that conform to society's perception of the individual. This conclusion
does not necessarily hold true when applied to other trans individuals; for
this reason, this comment acknowledges its applicability only to disputes
involving transsexuals.
IX. EVIDENCE OF GENDER ASSESSMENT
Evidence supporting a gender assessment approach exists in several of
the cases that have addressed transsexual identity for the purpose of adju-
dication of marital and discrimination claims. These cases show a willing-
ness to accept gender assessment as the middle ground. That is, the
courts continue to utilize the binary of male and female, mandating a
determination of the transsexual's identity as one or the other but also
accept that the decision may involve abandoning the idea that sexual
characteristics sum to a perfect gender match.
A. MORE THAN SEX DETERMINATION: IN RE LADRACH
In In re Ladrach, the Probate Court of Stark County, Ohio addressed
the issues of whether a post-operative female transsexual is permitted
98. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of
Care for Gender Identity Disorders, at http://www.hbigda.org/soc5.htm ("The act of fully
adopting a new or evolving gender role for the events and processes of everyday life is
known as the real-life experience.").
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under Ohio law to marry a male and whether a birth certificate may be
modified to reflect the sexual reassignment operation.99 Ladrach filed for
declaratory judgment on three issues: that the court issue an order find-
ing that she be referred to as a female for legal purposes, that the order
be attached to her birth certificate, and that a marriage license be is-
sued. 100 Previously she and her fianc6, a man, had tried to obtain a mar-
riage license at the Stark County Probate Court but had been denied
because her birth certificate still indicated that she was male, and an Ohio
statute precluded same-sex marriages. 1 1 Ladrach testified that she con-
sidered herself female, despite the fact she had been born male and had
been married twice before, both times to females.'02
Much like Littleton, Ladrach refused to recognize the union, and the
court also did not agree that a modification of Ladrach's birth certificate
was proper. 10 3 Adhering to a sex determination approach, the court
stated, "It is generally accepted that a person's sex is determined at birth
by an anatomical examination by the birth attendant. This results in a
declaration on the birth certificate of either 'boy' or 'girl' or 'male' or
'female."1a04 Birth designation, the court reasoned, should be the classifi-
cation that attaches to individuals throughout their lives. The court de-
nied relief to Ladrach, identifying itself solely as an interpreter of statutes
and noting that success for a claim such as Ladrach's depended upon the
legislature's decision to modify the marital statute in the future. 10 5
The court did not stop its analysis at this point. Instead it included a
cryptic final paragraph that implied a gender assessment approach could
be the more appropriate way to determine some of these cases, although
not the instant action.
There was no evidence that applicant at birth had any physical char-
acteristics other than those of the male and he was thus correctly
designated "Boy" on his birth certificate. There also was no labora-
tory documentation that the applicant had other than male chromo-
somes. There has been nothing shown to this court to cause it to
change the existing Ohio law. 106
What if there had been evidence of female characteristics on Ladrach's
body at the time of birth? Was the court referring to the somewhat "arbi-
trary" choice of sex that the physician and parents of the intersex infant
make immediately after the birth of the infant (since the decision is made
in accordance with medical guidelines that in no way assure conformity
with the individual's later established gender)? 10 7 What if Ladrach had
been an intersex infant or had an XXY chromosome structure? The
99. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
100. Id. at 830.
101. Id. at 829.
102. Id. at 830.




107. See Bradley et al., supra note 58, at 132-33.
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court seems to suggest that had Ladrach offered this type of evidence, it
would have considered issuing a holding that would modify the Ohio
statutes.
The court's opinion proves contradictory. On one hand, it claims not
to have the authority to function as judicial activist, yet on the other
hand, it offers to modify the laws upon a showing of specific evidence.
Presumably the evidence sought functions as a red flag to the court that
the individual has experienced gender identity issues throughout his/her
life. Evidence of ambiguous sexual characteristics at birth, according to
the court's reasoning, would justify its decision to allow changes in birth
certificates more so than evidence of medically-recognized surgical proce-
dures that an individual has undergone to bring his/her sex in conformity
with the gender he/she has adopted. The court's rule expresses a willing-
ness to make exceptions for the significant number of individuals who are
born with intersex characteristics but precludes the much larger number
of individuals with documented gender dysphoria from receiving special
exceptions.
The court's contradictory holding no doubt stems from its discomfort
with a sex determination analysis. Although unwilling to deviate from
this approach, the court chooses to validate the reality that sexual charac-
teristics are not always congruent with gender. This court could eliminate
its contradictory holding if it would adopt a gender assessment approach
for the issue of determining an individual's maleness or femaleness. The
birth certificate determination functions as an assessment of the gender
traits society can expect the infant to adopt as he continues along the
various stages of development. Although the birth certificate achieves its
purpose for the majority of individuals in this country, it fails its purpose
for individuals suffering with GID who adopt the gender that does not
conform to the sex reflected on their birth certificates. Thus, the court
should permit changes to birth certificates when the individual who peti-
tions the court passes the gender assessment analysis. That is, the court
must analyze the gender role that the individual has chosen to adopt and
determine whether the individual has taken advantage of all possible sci-
entific procedures or other therapies to bring his sex in conformity with
the chosen gender.108 Only then will the court be fulfilling the intent of
the legislature in its reading of the statute.
B. A MOVE TOWARD GENDER: M.T. v. J.T.
In M. T. v. J. T., the Superior Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of
whether the marriage between a male and a post-operative female
transsexual was void since the transsexual was biologically male at the
108. The meaning of the word "possible" refers not just to the number of therapies that
exist but also to those that the individual litigant is able to afford. Recently, challenges to
federal health programs that fail to provide coverage for sexual reassignment surgery have
been unsuccessful. See Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
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time of the marriage ceremony. 10 9 M.T.'s situation was similar to that of
Christie Littleton's: although born a male, M.T. had experienced a desire
to become the other gender since a very young age.110 She began dating
men when she was fourteen years old.' Eventually she cohabitated with
a male, J.T., and at that point approached a physician about the possibil-
ity of becoming a woman through surgery. 112 Within a year, J.T. had paid
for her to have surgery for the removal of male sex organs and the con-
struction of a vagina."l 3 Her birth certificate was changed in New York,
and she and J.T. married thereafter." 4 Two years after the marriage J.T.
left M.T. and stopped supporting her as he had done since they had mar-
ried. 115 M.T.'s claim against J.T. was one for weekly financial support.
The court began its analysis by articulating that "a lawful marriage re-
quires the performance of a ceremonial marriage of two persons of oppo-
site sex, a male and a female," despite the fact that the marital statutes
contained no such explicit requirement. 116 The court felt that a reading
of the statutes that would permit marriages between persons of the same
sex would be contrary to an implicit legislative intent."17 The court re-
jected the anatomical classification of an individual for the purposes of
marriage and refused to accept the argument that, with respect to this
issue, the sex of an individual is determined at birth. 1 8 Launching into a
discussion of what is meant by the word "sex," the court comes close to
engaging in a gender assessment analysis. In the court's effort to define
the word "sex" in a more expansive and encompassing way, it explained
that the "evidence and authority which we have examined, however,
show that a person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender,
that is, one's self image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of
sexual identity and character." 1 9 The court adopts a more progressive
approach by taking into account these elements of gender identity:
A transsexual in a proper case can be treated medically by certain
supportive measures and through surgery to remove and replace ex-
isting genitalia with sex organs which will coincide with the person's
gender. If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the post-
operative transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby pos-
sessed of the full capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as
the case may be, we perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social ta-
boo, or reason grounded in public policy to prevent that person's
109. 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).






116. Id. at 207.
117. Id. at 208 ("It is so strongly and firmly implied from a full reading of the statutes
that a different legislative intent, one which would sanction a marriage between persons of
the same sex, cannot be fathomed.").




identification at least for purposes of marriage to the sex finally
indicated. 120
Although using this analysis, because the court held that, for the pur-
poses of marriage, M.T. was a female, its approach falls short since the
court will only validate a new gender if the transsexual is post-opera-
tive-if he or she has undergone sexual reassignment surgery. Sex deter-
mination analyses, even the one used in M. T., ultimately fail the litigants
because the courts refuse to recognize that the focus is gender. Conceiva-
bly, it would be possible for legislators to place themselves in the shoes of
medical scientists and physicians in an effort to identify the multitude of
possible genetic and psychological abnormalities that only a minority of
individuals in this country experience. In this manner, they could draft a
fair and encompassing statute that would provide the courts with the nec-
essary tools for making a determination of an individual's maleness or
femaleness for purposes of "public records, service in the branches of the
armed forces, participation in certain regulated sports activities, eligibility
for types of employment and," of course, marriage. 121
Assuming that a legislature would endeavor to undertake such a task, a
better solution is for the courts to develop a functional approach to these
issues which looks something like that discussed in M. T. except that the
approach would focus more upon the transsexual litigant's gender role.
Because of the range of options available to individuals for treating ge-
netic abnormalities or gender dysphoria, gender determination should
consider transsexuals' efforts to bring their sexual characteristics in con-
formity with their adopted gender role, but the conformity cannot be a
conclusive determination of gender.122 When the court makes a determi-
nation of someone's maleness or femaleness, it will have arguably the
most significant impact upon that individual's life. To base the determi-
nation solely upon transsexuals' abilities-whether physically or finan-
cially-to modify their sex characteristics (breasts, estrogen, and vagina v.
penis, testosterone, and testicles) is a demeaning way to treat these indi-
viduals, who qualify as mentally ill, in the courts of law. Courts must, in
order to properly respect these individuals, view identity within the
framework of gender. They must make an inquiry that determines the
gender roles the individuals have adopted; this includes an exploration of
sexual characteristics but, more importantly, social characteristics. After
all, members of the Religious Right and Trans Liberation would probably
both agree that the concern is how society perceives the individual. Psy-
chology tells us that how we perceive ourselves is very influential over
how society will perceive us. Regardless of any anomalous sex character-
istics the individual may have, if the decision to classify according to gen-
der is based upon testimony of the individual and his/her treating
120. Id. at 210-11.
121. Id. at 209.
122. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of
Care for Gender Identity Disorders, at http://www.hbigda.org/soc5.html.
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physician that he/she made a firm lifestyle change, the court will produce
a more grounded result. As M. T. revealed, the courts' outcomes in these
cases should align with the result that fosters the social well-being of the
transsexual. 123
Hesitation to adopt a gender assessment approach may arise from the
fear that it is not based upon a bright-line rule and involves much more of
a trust factor than traditional sex determination because of the balancing
of the anatomical and genetic indicators in favor of the gender role which
the transsexual has adopted. In Anonymous v. Weiner, the court refused
to modify the birth certificate of a male-to-female transsexual because to
do so would increase the chance of fraud, 124 but this holding was criti-
cized in an opinion published a few years later that addressed the same
issues. M. T. highlighted the trial court's findings against the probability
of fraud: "The transsexual is not committing a fraud upon the public. In
actuality, she is doing her utmost to remove any false faqade. 12 5
For this reason, courts should not hesitate to embrace a gender assess-
ment approach that would rely mostly upon the individual's adopted gen-
der role with reference to the sex characteristics of maleness and
femaleness that function as indicators. There is little to fear from a social
standpoint because the probability of fraud is slight. If provided with
enough evidence of documented gender dysphoria from a physician or
clinician, along with the sworn testimony of the affected individual, to
meet the burden of proof then the court has exactly what it needs to
make the proper determination of maleness and femaleness under a gen-
der assessment analysis. As M.T. implied, the court would be doing the
public a service by adopting a more fluid approach-one that accepts the
gender the transsexual litigant desires to be. Any other approach per-
petuates the myth that although the post-operative female transsexual
lives her life day in, day out as a female, representing herself to society
with all the qualities stereotypically associated with females, she is actu-
ally a male.
C. MALE AND FEMALE MEANS MORE TODAY:
ULANE V. EASTERN AIRLINES
Another reason courts have been reluctant to adopt a gender assess-
ment approach is because it would mean expanding traditional definitions
of what it means to be male and female. In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, the
court expressed an unwillingness to do so when faced with a Title VII
claim brought by Karen Ulane, a post-operative transsexual female.126
Eastern Airlines ("Eastern") hired her for a pilot position in 1968 when
she was living as Kenneth Ulane. 127 During her employment with East-
123. 355 A.2d at 211.
124. 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
125. 355 A.2d at 210.
126. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at 1082.
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ern Airlines, she underwent sexual reassignment surgery in 1980 and was
subsequently able to get her birth certificate modified to reflect the
change. 128 Eastern did not know about the surgery until she returned to
work after it was performed and, in 1981, Eastern fired Ulane.129
The court held that Title VII, based on its legislative history, does not
protect transsexuals from discrimination.130 It also considered Ulane's
argument that Eastern discriminated against her because she was a fe-
male. When considering the allegation, the court exposed its aversion to
the suggestion of classifying a male-to-female transsexual as a female.
[I]t may be that society ... considers Ulane to be female. But even if
one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what re-
mains of a man, that does not decide this case .... It is clear from the
evidence that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not
because she is female, but because Ulane is a transsexual-a biologi-
cal male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgi-
cally altered parts of her body to make it appear to be female.' 3 '
When the court classified Ulane as a transsexual, the court essentially
classified her as an "it"-an individual without a sex. From the court's
perspective Ulane was not quite of the female sex because she retained
male chromosomes. The court, however, failed to state why it could so
confidently categorize Ulane as a man since the only male characteristic
she had was a genotype of 46 (XY). The court's apparent confidence
functions as a cover for its utter confusion about how to classify Ulane for
purposes of the statute. The court holds that Title VII does not protect
transsexuals-only men and women-but by utilizing this reasoning, the
court unknowingly engages in the self-identification debate. Essentially
Ulane acknowledges that gender identities other than male and female
exist, yet in its blind adherence to a sex determination approach, Ulane
refuses to legally validate this alternative gender expression by reading
Title VII expansively. If the court refuses to accept the argument that
Ulane is a woman, then the court needs to recognize that she is not a man
either. Were she still considered a man by the outside world, it is likely
that Eastern Airlines would not have terminated Ulane's employment
contract.
Even if the court was unwilling to recognize a new gender expression,
by confidently determining that Ulane is not a woman, the court harshly
declined the opportunity it had been given to expand the traditional defi-
nitions of woman (or man) to which, not just the legal world-with some
exceptions such as M. T.-but also most of society in general, still ad-
heres. 32 A gender assessment approach would allow for this expansion,
as it would not deny Ulane any legal recognition as a woman simply be-
cause she lacks the chromosomal structure that most but not all women
128. Id. at 1083.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1084-85.
131. Id. at 1087.
132. Keller, supra note 53, at 347-48.
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possess. Instead the court would consider Ulane's sex characteristics and
the qualities society has collectively deemed as feminine in nature, while
fully recognizing that these qualities are constantly changing as times
change. Furthermore, many of these qualities may even be rejected by
society because of the negativity surrounding stereotypes. Courts need to
remember, however, that often the goal of pre-operative transsexuals is
to embody the characteristics of the opposite gender, even the stereo-
types about the gender.133
D. FOLLOWING LOGIC THROUGH GENDER ASSESSMENT:
IN RE ESTATE OF GARDINER
On May 11, 2001, the Kansas Court of Appeals held in In re Estate of
Gardiner that a trial court when determining the validity of a marriage
where one spouse's sex is called into question must determine whether
the individual was male or female at the time the individual's marriage
license was issued as opposed to simply identifying the chromosomal
structure with which the individual was born. 134 J'Noel, a post-operative
female transsexual, met and married Marshall G. Gardiner in 1998.135
Marshall had a son, Joe, from a previous marriage. 136 When Marshall
died in August of 1999, both J'Noel and Joe filed petitions for letters of
administration, and each objected to the other's petition.137 Joe moved
for summary judgment on the invalidity of the marriage between J'Noel
and Marshall and on two other issues. He specifically challenged J'Noel's
status of surviving spouse on the grounds that her marriage to Marshall
was void under the Kansas marital statute.138 J'Noel moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether she is legally a female and
could be classified as one at the time of her marriage to Marshall. 139 The
court held that the marriage was void under the Kansas marital statute-
permitting civil contracts between two parties who are of the opposite sex
and voiding any other type of marriage-thereby nullifying J'Noel's claim
to Marshall's estate under the laws of intestate succession. 140 J'Noel ap-
pealed the court's denial of her motion for partial summary judgment. 141
J'Noel was born Jay Noel Ball in Green Bay, Wisconsin and was identi-
fied as male at the time of her birth.142 Since childhood, J'Noel had ex-
perienced strong desires to become female and was diagnosed with
GID.' 43 J'Noel began the intensive process of transitioning to the female
133. See CROMWELL, supra note 7, at 107.
134. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
135. Id. at 1091.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1090.








gender in the early 1990s.144 Beginning with counseling and therapy,
J'Noel proceeded to undergo electrolysis, hormone therapy treatment,
and a tracheal shave. 145 She then underwent surgical procedures includ-
ing a bilateral orchiectomy to remove her testes and rhinoplasty for the
modification of her nose.' 46 In August of 1994, J'Noel underwent sexual
reassignment surgery, and she received a new birth certificate reflecting
her surgical sex change after she petitioned the Circuit Court of
Outagamie County, Wisconsin, pursuant to a Wisconsin statute.147
Gardiner provides the most recent example of a court's use of gender
assessment for resolving a dispute involving a transsexual litigant. Gar-
diner reversed the district court's holding that J'Noel's marriage to Mar-
shall was invalid and remanded the case with instructions on how to
determine J'Noel's gender.148 The court began its analysis by stating that
the legislative history of the Kansas marital act affirmed the traditional
view of marriage but did not explicitly prohibit marriages in which one
party was a post-operative transsexual.' 49 Framing the issue in the case
as whether J'Noel was a female at the time her marriage license was is-
sued, the court explained the criteria that should be used to make this
determination. Refusing to allow chromosomes to be the determinative
factor, the court instructed that chromosomes, in addition to genitalia,
hormones, and phenotype should all be deemed significant in the deci-
sion-making process.' 50 The Gardiner court was also the first to focus, in
part, upon the litigant's gender. Rejecting Littleton as "a rigid and sim-
plistic approach to issues that are far more complex than addressed in
that opinion," and offering approval for the rationale provided in M. T.,
the court moved away from a sex determination approach and instead
embraced gender assessment. 151 It reasoned that the Kansas marital stat-
ute does not require proof of one's sex to obtain a marriage license and
concluded that doing so would raise questions about the validity of mar-
riages in which one spouse has a genetic abnormality. 152 Furthermore,
the court emphasized the stable relationship between J'Noel and her
spouse that was marked by emotional and physical compatibility and ac-
knowledged that it found no evidence of fraud.1 53 The opinion concluded
with a physician's quote that advocated a closer look at how the individ-
ual views him or herself in the context of gender determinations. A pos-
sible interpretation of this message is that, when faced with incompatible
factors, the best policy courts could adopt is to resolve these conflicts in
favor of the individual's adopted gender role. In its entirety, Gardiner
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1091-92.
146. Id. at 1092.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1110.
149. Id. at 1093.
150. Id. at 1110.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1094.
153. Id. at 1110.
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shows how it is possible for a court to implement a workable approach
that properly respects the life experiences of transsexual litigants while
still remaining faithful to the legislative intent of the statute at issue.
X. CONCLUSION
Transsexuals have problems living comfortably in the world because of
their intense yearning to become the opposite gender; the yearning is so
painful that transsexuals' daily lives become crippled by the stress. Nor-
mal life activities such as working and interacting with others become
agonizing. Like other mental illnesses, gender dysphoria can effectively
be treated. Courts not only need to recognize that the treatment exists,
but they should attempt to provide legal validation of the end goals of
these therapies and surgeries within the system of the sex/gender binary
to which society continues to adhere. This paper does not address
whether the breakdown of the sex/gender binary system would prove
beneficial to society as a whole. Rather, it recognizes that society contin-
ues to classify based upon two established categories: maleness and
femaleness, while a movement to dissolve or at least blur these two cate-
gories is slowly gaining momentum. Within this existing framework, the
courts need to develop an approach for providing adequate relief for
transsexuals seeking legitimate remedies.
The sex determination approach fails to give appropriate relief to
transsexual litigants as well as yields results contrary to the apparent in-
tent underlying many applicable state statutes. First, by holding that be-
cause an individual was born male or female, he or she remains as such
throughout life fails to give any credibility to the treatment plans availa-
ble to transsexuals. Second, inflexible sex determination analyses yield
results that the lawmakers of many states desired to prohibit. The self-
identification approach also does not work for transsexuals at this time
since transsexuals embrace the concepts of two distinct genders, and they
try very hard to adopt typically male or female traits. Gender assessment
offers a compromise between the two approaches. Using this approach,
courts adhere to two distinct gender classifications but expand the defini-
tions of male and female to take into account that transsexuals, because
of available medical treatments, can fit comfortably within the system
that society continues to accept. Until legal changes are made that revo-
lutionize sex/gender classification, disputes involving transsexuals require
heightened sensitivity to the pertinent issues and a workable analysis.
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